Abstract-Despite the linearity of its encoding, compressed sensing (CS) may be used to provide a limited form of data protection when random encoding matrices are used to produce sets of low-dimensional measurements (ciphertexts). In this paper, we quantify by theoretical means the resistance of the least complex form of this kind of encoding against known-plaintext attacks. For both standard CS with antipodal random matrices and recent multiclass encryption schemes based on it, we show how the number of candidate encoding matrices that match a typical plaintext-ciphertext pair is so large that the search for the true encoding matrix inconclusive. Such results on the practical ineffectiveness of known-plaintext attacks underlie the fact that even closely related signal recovery under encoding matrix uncertainty is doomed to fail. Practical attacks are then exemplified by applying CS with antipodal random matrices as a multiclass encryption scheme to signals such as images and electrocardiographic tracks, showing that the extracted information on the true encoding matrix from a plaintextciphertext pair leads to no significant signal recovery quality increase. This theoretical and empirical evidence clarifies that, although not perfectly secure, both standard CS and multiclass encryption schemes feature a noteworthy level of security against known-plaintext attacks, therefore increasing its appeal as a negligible-cost encryption method for resource-limited sensing applications.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper elaborates on the possibility of exploiting Compressed Sensing (CS) [1] , [2] not only to reduce the resource requirements for signal acquisition, but also to protect the acquired data so that their information is hidden from unauthorised receivers. A number of prior analyses [3] - [7] show that, although the encoding performed by CS cannot be regarded as perfectly secure, practical encryption is still provided at a very limited cost, either at the analog-to-digital Manuscript received April 4, 2015; accepted June 19, 2015 . Date of publication June 29, 2015 ; date of current version August 27, 2015 . The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Prof. Mauro Barni.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS. 2015.2450676 interface or immediately after it, in early digital-to-digital processing stages. Such a lightweight encryption scheme may be particularly beneficial to acquisition systems within the framework of wireless sensor networks [8] where large amounts of data are locally acquired by sensor nodes with extremely tight resource budgets, and afterwards transmitted to a remote node for further processing. When the security of these transmissions is an issue, low-resource techniques that help balancing the trade-off between encryption strength and computational cost may offer an attractive design alternative to the deployment of separate conventional encryption stages.
An encryption scheme based on CS leverages the fact that, in its framework, a high-dimensional signal is encoded by linear projection on a random subspace, thus producing a set of low-dimensional measurements. These can be mapped back to the acquired signal only under prior assumptions on its sparsity [9] and a careful choice of random subspaces such as those defined by antipodal random (also known as Bernoulli random [10] , [11] ) encoding matrices. In addition, suitable sparse signal recovery algorithms [12] - [14] are required to decode the original signal. These must be applied with an exact knowledge of the subspace on which the signal was projected. In complete absence of this information the acquired signal is unrecoverable. Hence, this subspace may be generated from a shared secret between the transmitter and intended receivers that enables their high-quality signal recovery.
If, on the other hand, the above subspace is only partially known, a low-quality version of the signal may be recovered from its measurements, with a degradation that increases gracefully with the amount of missing information on the projection subspace. By exploiting this effect, multiclass encryption schemes were devised [5] , [7] in which high-class users are able to decode high-quality information starting from a complete knowledge of the shared secret, while lower-class users only recover a low-quality approximation of the acquired signal starting from partial knowledge of the secret. In order to take full advantage of this scheme, its security must be quantitatively assessed against potential cryptanalyses. The theoretical and empirical evidence provided in [7] dealt with statistical attacks on the measurements produced by universal random encoding matrices [10] .
In this paper we address the resistance of an embodiment of CS against Known-Plaintext Attacks (KPAs), i.e., in threatening situations where a malicious eavesdropper has gained access to an instance of the signal (plaintext) and its corresponding random measurements (ciphertext), and from this information tries to infer the corresponding instance of an antipodal random encoding matrix. KPAs are more threatening than attacks solely based on observing the ciphertext. Yet, we will show how both simple and multiclass encryption based on CS exhibit a noteworthy level of resistance against this class of attacks due to the nature of the encoding.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II we briefly review the fundamentals of CS and multiclass encryption in the two-class case, which distinguishes between first-class receivers authorised to reconstruct the signal with full quality and second-class receivers with reduced decoding quality.
Section III describes KPAs as delivered both by eavesdroppers and second-class receivers who aim at improving the quality of their signal recovery. There, it is shown that the expected number of candidate solutions matching a plaintextciphertext pair is enormous, thus implying that finding the true encoding matrix among such a huge solution set is practically infeasible. To extend this analysis, we also attack the two-class encryption scheme by using recovery algorithms that compensate encoding matrix perturbations [15] , [16] as suffered by a second-class receiver. Their performances are shown to be equal to a standard decoding algorithm [13] that does not attempt such compensation, i.e., that legitimately recovers the acquired signal at the prescribed quality level.
In Section IV the previous KPAs are exemplified for electrocardiographic tracks (ECG) and images containing sensitive identification text. For all these cases we give empirical evidence on how, even in favourable attack conditions, the encoding matrices produced by KPAs perform poorly when trying to decode any further ciphertext. Theoretical and empirical evidence allows us to conclude that compressed sensingbased encryption, albeit not perfectly secure [3] , provides some security properties and defines a framework in which their violation is non-trivial. The Appendices report the proofs of the Propositions and Theorems given in Section III.
A. Relation to Prior Work
To prove how CS and multiclass encryption provide a satisfying level of privacy even against informed attacks, this work addresses the problem of finding all the instances of an antipodal random encoding matrix that map a known plaintext to the corresponding ciphertext, when both quantities are deterministic and digitally represented. Our analysis hinges on the connection between linear encoding by antipodal random matrices, the subset-sum problem [17] and its expected number of solutions [18] . While the authors of [3] proved how CS lacks perfect secrecy in the Shannon sense [19] , both [3] and [4] contrasted this with computational security evidence substantially based on brute-force attacks. Our improvement in the specific, yet practically important case of antipodal random encoding matrices is in that our analysis predicts how the expected number of candidate solutions to a KPA varies with the plaintext dimensionality and its digital representation.
In addition, we evaluate specific attacks to multiclass encryption by CS in the case of lower-class users attempting to upgrade their recovery quality. To assess the resistance of this strategy against KPAs, we apply a similar theoretical analysis. Then, we extend the attacks to include sparse signal recovery under matrix uncertainty [15] , [16] based on the idea that missing information [20] , perturbations [21] , [22] and basis mismatches [23] could be partially compensated, although we verify that is not the case with the random perturbation entailed by multiclass encryption.
II. MULTICLASS ENCRYPTION BY COMPRESSED SENSING

A. A Brief Review of Compressed Sensing
The encryption schemes we consider in this paper are based on Compressed Sensing (CS) [1] , [2] , a mathematical framework in which a signal represented by a vector x ∈ R n is acquired by applying a linear, dimensionality-reducing transformation A : R n → R m (i.e., the encoding matrix) to generate a vector of measurements y = Ax, y ∈ R m , m < n. To enable the recovery of x given y, CS leverages the fact that x is known to be sparse in a proper basis D, i.e., for any instance of x its representation is x = Ds where s ∈ R n has a number of nonzero entries at most k n. The results presented in this paper are independent of D, which we consider an orthonormal basis for the sake of simplicity. In addition, the encoding matrix A must obey some information-preserving guarantees [24] , [25] that we assume verified throughout this paper and essentially impose that m = O(k log n). The most relevant fact here is that when A is a typical realisation of a random matrix with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) entries following a subgaussian distribution [26] we are reassured that signal recovery is possible regardless of the chosen basis D. In fact, some signal recovery algorithms exist for which guarantees can be given with very high probability [12] along with an ever-growing plethora of fast iterative methods capable of reconstructing x starting from y, A and D. An essential decoding scheme is the convex optimisation problem known as basis pursuit with denoising,
where the 1 -norm in the objective function promotes the sparsity ofx with respect to D, while the 2 -norm constraint enforces its fidelity to the measurements up to a threshold ω ≥ 0 that accounts for noise sources. In particular, we here concentrate on operators A ∈ {−1, 1} m×n that are realisations of an antipodal random matrix with i.i.d. entries and equiprobable symbols {−1, 1} [10] ; such matrices are known to verify the above guarantees, and are remarkably (i ) simple, and therefore suitable to be generated, implemented and stored in digital devices (ii) random in nature, thus suggesting the possibility of exploiting such randomness to generate an encryption mechanism using the linear encoding scheme of CS. Due to their limited set of possible symbols {−1, 1}, such antipodal random matrices are more easily subject to cryptanalysis; for this reason, we tackle them as a baseline for those defined by a larger set of symbols.
B. Security and Two-Class Encryption by Compressed Sensing
1) A Security Perspective: the knowledge of A is necessary in the recovery of x from y, since any error in its entries reflects on the quality of the recovered signal [21] . A number of security analyses leveraging this fundamental fact were introduced [3] , [4] , [7] in which CS is regarded as a symmetric encryption scheme, where the plaintext x is mapped to the ciphertext y by means of the linear transformation operated by A, i.e., the encryption algorithm. The ciphertext is then stored or transmitted, and its intended receivers may decrypt x by knowing y, the sparsity basis D, and by having a prior agreement on the encryption key or shared secret that is necessary to reproduce A.
The ideal requirement for a secure application of CS (as noted in [3] and [27] ) is that any encoding matrix instance is used for at most one plaintext-ciphertext pair; this implies the use of a potentially infinite sequence of encoding matrices {A [t ] } t ∈N . In violation of this non-repeatability hypothesis, each A [t ] could be simply recovered by collecting n linearly independent plaintext-ciphertext pairs related by it, i.e., by solving a linear system of equations with the mn entries of A [t ] as the unknowns.
In practice, the encoding matrices are obtained by algorithmic expansion of the shared secret, e.g., by using the key as the seed of a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) which outputs a reproducible bitstream. Due to its deterministic and finite-state nature, this stream yields a periodic sequence of encoding matrices {A [t mod P] } t ∈N repeating with period P, where each A [t ] is obtained by mapping mn distinct bits to antipodal symbols.
Thus, the non-repeatability hypothesis will be granted by a system-level choice of an encryption key and PRNG that makes P large enough to exceed any reasonable observation time.
However, such pseudo-random bitstreams may themselves be vulnerable to cryptanalysis if a few of their bits are exposed. As a simple example of this threat, assume that the encoding matrices are generated by a maximal-length shift register sequence [28, Ch. 4] , for which a B key bit seed
. Regrettably, such a sequence is easily cryptanalysed from only 2B key of its bits by the well-known Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [29] . Hence, a successful KPA that retrieves even part of an encoding matrix, e.g., one of its rows, may expose just enough information to reveal the key and therefore break a CS-based encryption. To contrast this type of threat, our analysis shows how KPAs are incapable of revealing missing information on the true encoding matrices, whose symbols remain undetermined.
2) Two-Class Encryption: in an extended version of this encryption framework, i.e., two-class encryption by CS [5] , [7] , we consider a first sequence of matrices
. . , n − 1} is obtained by pseudo-random expansion of a seed Key C (0) . We then generate a second sequence of matrices
( 1) with C (0), [t ] indicating which entries of A (0), [t ] must be sign-flipped to obtain A (1), [t ] , that is then used to encode x into y. Thus, we consider a cardinality c for every
, define η = c /mn the sign flipping density, and let A (0) , A (1) , C (0) be generic, unique random matrix instances (that is, the matrix sequences will be implicitly considered from now on). Given any plaintext x, the corresponding ciphertext y is produced as y = A (1) x, A (1) being the true encoding matrix. Two-class encryption is then achieved by distributing Key A (0) to all authorised receivers and Key C (0) only to first-class receivers. In fact, when y is communicated, receivers knowing both Key A (0) and Key C (0) are able to rebuild the corresponding A (1) used in the encoding and reconstruct x with full quality by solving BPDN with ω = 0.
On the other hand, second-class receivers may only rebuild A (0) from their available information. For 0 < η 1 such a matrix is an approximation of the corresponding A (1) , thus allowing signal recovery with lower quality than that achieved by first-class receivers. Furthermore, any receiver not knowing Key A (0) has no information on the encoding matrix and is consequently unable to recover x, which remains encrypted.
In [7] we have characterised the effectiveness of this scheme by showing how eavesdroppers trying to compensate their ignorance of the key by means of straightforward statistical analysis of y are presented with approximately Gaussian-distributed ciphertexts (converging with rate O(n −1 )). In addition, if A (0) is an antipodal random matrix, the same can be said of A (1) since the statistics of its equiprobable symbols are unaltered by C (0) used to build the latter from the former. Hence, the ciphertext is statistically indistinguishable from the one that could be produced by encoding the same plaintext with A (0) instead of A (1) , and second-class users will also be unable to exploit the statistical properties of y.
C. Signal Models and Assumptions
Since the attacks we present rely on deterministic knowledge of x and y, we assume throughout the paper that both plaintexts and ciphertexts are represented by digital words. For simplicity, we let x = {x l } n−1 l=0 be such that x l ∈ {−L, . . . , −1, 0, 1, . . . , L} for some integer L > 0. Note that the number of bits representing the plaintext in this fashion is at least B x = log 2 (2L + 1) , so we may assume B x is less than a few tens in typical embodiments (actually, B x ≤ 32 bit in typical signal processing applications). Consequently, the ciphertext will be represented by {y l } m−1 l=0 , where each y l is quantised with B y = B x + log 2 n bit that avoid any information loss.
III. KNOWN-PLAINTEXT ATTACKS
In view of quantifying the resistance of this scheme to threatening cryptanalyses, we now consider situations in which an attacker gains access to a given, exact value of the plaintext x corresponding to a ciphertext y. Based on this knowledge, the attacker aims at computing the true encoding A (1) such that y = A (1) x. In the following we will consider a KPA by assuming that only one (x, y) pair is known for a certain A (1) , consistently with the hypothesis that A (1) is never reused in the encoding (as detailed in Section II-B1). This type of attack gives rise to different strategies (see Figure 1 ) whether the attacker knows nothing except the (x, y) pair (a pure eavesdropper, Eve) or it is a second-class receiver knowing also the partially correct encoding A (0) and attempting to complete its knowledge of A (1) (we will call this malicious second-class user Steve and its KPA a class-upgrade).
For the sake of simplicity, both KPAs are here characterised on a single row 1 of A (1) , while a complete KPA will entail m of such attacks. Furthermore, we note that the analysis is carried out in full compliance with Kerckhoffs's principle [30] , i.e., the only information that the attackers are missing is their respective part of the encryption key, while any other detail on the sparsity basis, as well as two-class encryption specifications is here regarded as known.
A. Eavesdropper's Known-Plaintext Attack
Given a plaintext x and the corresponding ciphertext y = A (1) x we now assume the perspective of Eve and attempt to recover A (1) j with a set of antipodal symbolsÂ
Moreover, to favour the attacker 2 we assume all x l = 0. We now introduce a combinatorial optimisation problem at the core of the analysed KPAs. Definition 1 (Subset-Sum Problem). Let {u l } n−1 l=0 , u l ∈ {1, . . . , L} ⊂ N + and υ ∈ N + . We define subset-sum problem (SSP) [17, Ch. 4 ] the problem of assigning n binary variables b l ∈ {0, 1}, l = 0, . . . , n − 1 such that
1 We denote with A j the j-th row of a matrix A. 2 If any x l = 0 each corresponding summand would give no contribution to the sum (2), thus makingÂ
j,l an undetermined variable in the attack.
We define solution any {b l } n−1 l=0 verifying (3). With the above definitions, the density of this problem is defined as [31] 
Although in general a SSP is NP-complete, not all of its instances are equally hard. In fact, it is known that high-density instances (i.e., δ(n, L) > 1) have plenty of solutions found or approximated by, e.g., dynamic programming, whereas low-density instances are typically hard, although for special cases polynomial-time algorithms have been found [31] . Moreover, such low-density hard SSP instances have been used in cryptography to develop the family of public-key knapsack cryptosystems [32] , [33] although most have been broken with polynomial-time algorithms [34] . Proposition 1 (Eve's KPA). The KPA to A 
This mapping is explained in Appendix A, and we define (x, y, A (1) j ) a problem instance. In our case we see that the density (4) is high since n is large and log 2 L is fixed by the digital representation of x (e.g., so that B x ≤ 64). We are therefore operating in a region in which a solution of the SSP (3) is typically found in polynomial time. In fact, the resistance of the analysed embodiment of CS against KPAs is not due to the hardness of the corresponding SSP but, as we show below, to the huge number of candidate solutions as n increases, among which an attacker should find the only true solution to guess a single row of A (1) . Since no a priori criterion exists to select them, we consider them indistinguishable. The next Theorem 3 calculates the expected number of candidate solutions to Eve's KPA by applying the theory developed in [18] . 
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. This result (as well as the whole statistical mechanics framework from which it is derived) gives no hint on how much (5) is representative of finite-n behaviours. To compensate for that, we here enumerate by means of the binary programming solver in CPLEX [35] all the solutions to several small-n problem instances of Proposition 1 and verify that, even non-asymptotically, the expression (5) can be used to effectively estimate the expected number of candidate solutions to Eve's KPA. Such numerical evidence is reported in Figure 2 , where the sample average of the number of solutionsŜ Eve (n, L) to 50 randomly generated problem instances with L = 10 4 and n = 16, . . . , 32 is plotted and compared with (5) .
The remarkable matching observed therein allows us to estimate, for example, that a KPA to the encoding of a grayscale image of n = 64 × 64 pixel quantised with B x = 8 bit (unsigned, i.e., L = 128, n = 4096) would have to discriminate on the average between 1.25 · 10 1229 equally good candidate solutions for each of the rows of the encoding matrix. This number is not far from the total possible rows, 2 4096 = 1.04 · 10 1233 . Hence, any attacker using this strategy is faced with a deluge of candidate solutions, from which it would choose one presumed to be exact to attempt a guess on a single row of A (1) .
A legitimate concern when the attacker is presented with such a set of solutions is that most of them could be good approximations of the true encoding matrix row A (1) j . To see whether this is the case, we quantify the difference between A (1) j and the corresponding candidatesÂ 
where P h (L) is a polynomial in L whose coefficients are reported in Table I for h = 2, . . . , 15.
The proof of this Theorem and the derivation of Table I are reported in Appendix B. As before, we collect some empirical evidence that the expression (6) correctly anticipates the expected number of solutions at a given Hamming distance from the true one, noting that Theorem 2 holds for finite n. Figure 3 reports for n = {21, 23, . . . , 31} the sample average, over the same 50 problem instances generated in the experimental evaluation of (5), of the number of solutions to Eve's KPA whose Hamming distance from the true one is a given value h = {2, . . . , 15}. This sample average is compared against the value predicted by (6) with the polynomial coefficients in Table I . The remarkable matching we observe allows us to estimate that, resuming the case of a grayscale image with n = 4096, L = 128, only 1.95 · 10 41 
T , so we may choose the key lifetime as T ≤ log 1 − S Eve (n, L) −1 −1 log ζ to ensure the security level set by ζ . Thus, we measure the key lifetime T in attack opportunities for Eve; however, since S Eve (n, L) is typically huge, the resulting T is also very large. As an example, by plugging n = 4096, L = 128 in (5) and assuming ζ = 0.9999, we obtain a key lifetime equivalent to at most T = 1.25·10 1225 attack opportunities.
B. Class-Upgrade Known-Plaintext Attack
A known-plaintext attack may also be attempted by Steve, a second-class receiver aiming to improve its signal recovery performances with the intent of reaching the same quality of a first-class receiver. In this KPA, a partially correct encoding matrix A (0) that differs from A (1) in c entries is also known in addition to x and y. With this prior, Steve may compute
here is an unknown matrix with ternary entries in {−2, 0, 2}. Hence, Steve performs a KPA by searching for a set of ternary symbols { A j,l } n−1 l=0 such that
of which it is known that A j,l = 0 only in c cases. Moreover, to ease the solution of this problem and make it row-wise separable, we assume that Steve has access to an even more accurate information, i.e., the exact number c j of non-zero entries for each row A j or equivalently the number of sign flips mapping A Definition 2 (γ -Cardinality Subset-Sum Problem). Let {u l } n−1 l=0 , u l ∈ {1, . . . , Q} ⊂ N + , γ ∈ {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N + and υ ∈ N + . We define γ -cardinality subset-sum problem (γ -SSP) the problem of assigning n binary variables b l ∈ {0, 1}, l = 0, . . . , n − 1 such that
We define solution any {b l } n−1 l=0 verifying (8) and (9).
. This SSP has a true solution {b l } n−1 l=0 that is mapped to the row A (1) j , and other candidate solutions that verify (8) and (9) but correspond to matrix rowsÂ (1) 
The derivation of Proposition 2 is reported in Appendix C. We define (x, y, A
j ) a problem instance. In the following, we will denote with r = c j/n the row-density of perturbations. Since in [18] the γ -cardinality SSP case is obtained as an extension of the results on the unconstrained SSP, we obtain the following Theorem. 
The proof of Theorem 3 is reported in Appendix C. The number of candidate solutions found by Steve's KPA is by many orders of magnitude smaller than Eve's KPA, the reason being that Steve requires much less information to achieve complete knowledge of the true encoding A (1) . In order to provide numerical evidence, we find all the solutions to Steve's KPA by means of the binary programming solver in CPLEX on a set of 50 randomly generated problem instances for L = 5·10 3 , a row-density of perturbations r = 5 /n, 10 /n, 15 /n and n = 20, . . . , 32 (except for r = 5 /n, whose solution enumeration is still computationally feasible up to n = 48). The sample average of the number of solutions,Ŝ Steve (n, L, r ), is reported in Figure 4 and well predicted by the theoretical value in (10); note that this approximation is increasingly accurate for large n. Moreover, by resuming the previous example our n = 64 × 64 pixel grayscale image quantised at B x = 8 bit and encoded with two-class CS using A with r = 0.03 will have on the average 6.25 · 10 234 candidate solutions of indistinguishable quality.
In terms of encryption key lifetime, leveraging the same considerations of Section III-A and simply replacing S Eve (n, L) with S Steve (n, L, r ) yields the key lifetimes T with respect to class-upgrade attacks; as an example, plugging n = 4096, L = 128, r = 0.03 in (10) and assuming ζ = 0.9999, yields at most T = 1.25 · 10 231 attack opportunities for Steve.
The previous KPA analyses hinge on a counting argument in a general setting, without any other side information on the structure of A (1) or A. As we will show in the experiments of Section IV, KPAs yield no advantage in terms of recovery performances to unintended receivers. Obviously, as further prior information becomes available (for example the knowledge that the unknown A has additional structure, or that the original signal is distributed is a non-uniform fashion [36] , [37] ) revealing the hidden information may be easier. Yet, this is true for any encryption scheme in which either the encryption key or the plaintext have a non-uniform distribution and is out of the scope of this analysis.
C. Signal Recovery-Based Class-Upgrade Attacks
Class-upgrade attacks to two-class encryption schemes are closely related to a recovery problem setting that has attracted some attention in prior works, i.e., sparse signal recovery under matrix uncertainty. To recast our problem in this setting, we may construct such a signal recovery-based attack by letting A (1) = A (0) + A as the encoding matrix, where A (0) is known a priori and A is an unknown random perturbation matrix. This information is paired with the knowledge of the ciphertext y and a prior on the unknown plaintext x, that is known to be sparse in a basis D. Thus, we attempt the joint recovery of x and A, eventually just leading to a refinement of the estimatedx. Two main algorithms are capable of addressing specifically this problem setup for a generic A, namely Generalised Approximate Message-Passing under Matrix Uncertainty (MU-GAMP [16] ) and Sparsity-cognisant Total Least-Squares (S-TLS [15] ).
Although appealing, this joint recovery approach can be anticipated to fail for multiple reasons. First, this attack is intrinsically harder than Steve's KPA in that the true plaintext x is here unknown. Whatever A is a candidate solution to Steve's KPA given x, is also a possible solution of joint recovery with the same x as a further part of the solution. Since we know from Section III-B that Steve's KPA typically has a huge number of indistinguishable and equally-sparse candidate solutions, at least as many will verify the joint recovery problem when the plaintext is also unknown. Hence, this approach has negligible odds of yielding more information on A than Steve's KPA.
Note that this relationship between the set of solutions to Steve's KPA and joint recovery-based attacks also prevents the latter from being of any use as a refinement step to improve A after its guess by an initial KPA. In fact, recovering an estimate of x in this case would be to no avail, since the true x must be known a priori in the initial KPA.
Notwithstanding this, the above joint recovery approach estimates x along with a new A; thus, the best-case achievable signal recovery is the true x, for which the candidate solutions in A are at best identical to those of the initial KPA, as by (7) they must verify ε = Ax. No improvement is therefore obtained by applying joint recovery after Steve's KPA.
Furthermore, going back to simple joint-recovery, note that it amounts to solving y = A (0) x + Ax with A and x unknown, that is clearly a non-linear equality involving non-convex/non-concave operators. In general, this is a hard problem; both the aforementioned algorithms are indeed able to effectively compensate matrix uncertainties Average recovery signal-to-noise ratio performances of a classupgrade attack using signal recovery under matrix uncertainty algorithms.
when A depends on a low-dimensional, deterministic set of parameters. However, such a model does not apply to two-class encryption: even if A is c-sparse, it has no deterministic structure -to make it so, one would need to know the exact set C (0) of c index pairs at which the sign flipping randomly occurred, which by itself entails a combinatorial search.
In fact, A is uniform in the sense of [16] since it may be regarded as a realisation of a random matrix with i.i.d. zero-mean, bounded-variance entries (as also detailed in [7] ). Hence, we expect the accuracy of the estimatex with joint recovery (both using S-TLS and MU-GAMP) to agree with the uniform matrix uncertainty case of [16] , where negligible improvement is shown with respect to the (non-joint) recovery algorithm GAMP [13] . The advocated reason is that the perturbation noise ε = Ax is asymptotically Gaussian for a given x [16, Proposition 2.1].
We now provide some empirical evidence on the ineffectiveness of joint recovery as a class-upgrade attack for finite n, m and sparsity k. As an example, we let n = 256, m = 128, k = 20 and η = c mn ∈ [0.005, 0.1] and generate 100 random instances of x = Ds with s which is k-sparse with respect to a randomly selected, known orthonormal basis D. For each η, we also generate 100 pairs of matrices (A (0) , A (1) ) related as (1) and encode x by y = A (1) x. Signal recovery is performed by MU-GAMP, S-TLS and GAMP. To maximise their performances, each of the algorithms is run with parameters provided by a "genie" revealing the exact value of the unknown features of x. In particular, MU-GAMP and GAMP are provided with an i.i.d. Bernoulli-Gaussian sparsity-enforcing signal model [13] , [38] having the exact mean, variance and sparsity level of the instances s. As far as the perturbation A is concerned, MU-GAMP is given the probability distribution of its i.i.d. entries. On the other hand, GAMP is initialised with the noise variance of ε = Ax, that is assumed Gaussian with i.i.d. entries. S-TLS is run in its locally-optimal, polynomial-time version [15, Sec. IV-B] and fine-tuned with respect to its regularisation parameter as η varies.
We here focus on measuring the Average 4 Recovery Signal-to-Noise Ratio of the latter, ARSNR (dB) = 10 log 10Ê deviation from this average is less than 1.71 dB in all the reported curves. The maximum ARSNR performance gap between GAMP and MU-GAMP is 1.22 dB while S-TLS attains generally lower performances for high values of η. These observed performances confirm what is also found in [16] , i.e., that GAMP, MU-GAMP and S-TLS substantially attain the same performances under uniform matrix uncertainty. As expected, class-upgrade attacks based on joint recovery are ineffective even for finite n and m, since GAMP under the same conditions is the reference case adopted in [7, Sec. IV] for the design of two-class encryption schemes.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
This Section aims at providing an intuitive appreciation of the poor quality obtained by signal recovery with KPA solutions. While the objective of KPAs is cryptanalysing the true encoding matrix to ultimately retrieve the encryption key, we here focus on the properties of KPA solutions as encoding matrix guesses that can, in the attackers' belief, improve their signal recovery quality. Thus, we verify that this improvement does not occur by exemplifying practical cases of KPAs in a common framework, which follows this procedure: 1) Attack: an attacker performing a KPA gains access to a single plaintext-ciphertext pair (x , y ), and attacks the corresponding true encoding matrix A (1) row-by-row; we here infer each row A (1) j by generating instances of an i.i.d. antipodal random vector until a large number of candidate solutionsÂ (1) j that verify y j =Â (1) j x is found. Thus, the inferredÂ (1) is composed by collecting the outputs of m Monte Carlo random searches for the corresponding matrix rows. This generation approach is preferable to solving each attacker's KPA by means of CPLEX's binary programming solver for two reasons. Firstly, it is known from Theorem 1 that the expected number of solutions is very large and thus the probability of finding one by random search is far from being negligible, while its computational cost is relatively low. Secondly, the theoretical conditions [24] that guarantee x can be retrieved from y despite the dimensionality reduction are applicable when A (1) is a typical realisation of an antipodal random matrix. On the contrary, integer programming solvers explore solutions in a systematic way, and tend to generate them in an ordered fashion. When only some of these solutions are considered (as obliged when n is large), this ordered approach yields non-typical sets ofÂ (1) j that could be very distant from A (1) j ; 2) Signal Recovery: to test its guessÂ (1) , the attacker may then pretend to ignore the known x and recover an approximationx from (y ,Â (1) ) by using a high-performance signal recovery algorithm such as GAMP [13] , optimally tuned as in Section III-C. In this setting we measure its accuracy by the Recovery Signal-to-Noise Ratio, RSNR = 10 log 10 which is the only quality indicator in the attacker's perspective forÂ (1) . The RSNR performances are here expected to match those of a (first-class) receiver fully informed on A (1) , as the equality y =Â (1) x is verified regardless of the exactness ofÂ (1) ; 3) Verification: as a further test ofÂ (1) , the attacker attempts the recovery of a second, unknown plaintext x encoded as y = A (1) x , of which it is only known that it was obtained with the same encoding matrix as y . The recoveryx is then obtained by means of GAMP, yielding a new RSNR = 10 log 10
unknown to the attacker. If any point with high RSNR ≈ RSNR is found, this will indicate the attacker's success at guessingÂ (1) close to the true A (1) . We will show how this never occurs with a large number of candidate solutions, and detail how the observed (RSNR , RSNR ) pairs are distributed. Both the practical examples of Eve and Steve's KPA follow the same procedure, with the exception that Eve directly generatesÂ (1) j , whereas Steve generates each rowÂ (1) . Repeating this search for m rows in both attacks provides Eve and Steve's candidate solutionsÂ (1) , of which we will study how the corresponding (RSNR , RSNR ) pairs are distributed as mentioned above.
A. Electrocardiographic Signals
We now consider ECG signals from the MIT PhysioNet database [39] sampled at f s = 256 Hz and encoded as described, from two windows x , x of n = 256 samples (and quantised with B x = 12 bit) into the measurement vectors y , y of dimensionality m = 90. Decoding is allowed by the sparsity level of the windowed signal when decomposed with D chosen as a Symmlet-6 orthonormal wavelet basis [40] .
We generate 2000 candidate solutions for both Eve and Steve's KPA that correspond to the recovery performances reported in Figure 6 . While both malicious users are able to reconstruct the known plaintext x with a relatively high average RSNR ≈ 25 dB (their KPAs indeed yield solutions to y =Â (1) x ), on the second window of samples x the eavesdropper achieves an average RSNR ≈ −0.20 dB (Figure 6 ), whereas the second-class decoder achieves an average RSNR ≈ 12.15 dB (Figure 6 ) when the twoclass encryption scheme is set to a sign flipping density η = c /mn = 0.03 between A (0) and A (1) . In this case, the nominal second-class RSNR = 11.08 dB when reconstructing x from y with A (0) , while the correlation coefficient between RSNR and RSNR is 0.0140; these figures clearly highlight the ineffectiveness of KPAs at inferring A (1) in this case. This is also confirmed by the perceptual quality ofx corresponding to the maximum RSNR highlighted in Figure 6 .
B. Sensitive Text in Images
In this example we consider the same test images used in [7] , i.e., 640 ×512 pixel grayscale images of people holding a printed identification text concealed by means of two-class encryption. To reduce the computational burden of KPAs we assume a block size of 64 × 64 pixel, B x = 8 bit per pixel, and encode the resulting n = 4096 pixels into m = 2048 measurements. Signal recovery is performed by assuming the blocks have a sparse representation on a 2D Daubechies-4 wavelet basis [40] . Two-class encryption is applied on the blocks containing printed text: we choose two adjacent blocks x , x containing some letters and encoded with the same A (1) ; in this case, the second-class decoder nominally achieves RSNR = 12.57 dB without attempting class-upgrade due to the flipping of c = 251658 entries (corresponding to a perturbation density η = 0.03) in the encoding matrix.
In order to test Eve and Steve's KPA we randomly generate 2000 solutions for the j -th row of the encoding given x , y : it is worth noting that while in the previous case the signal dimensionality is sufficiently small to produce a solution set in less than two minutes, in this case generating 2000 different solutions for a single row may take up to several hours for some particularly hard instances.
By using these candidate solutions to findx ,x we obtain the results of Figure 7 : while both attackers attain an average RSNR ≈ 33 dB on x , Eve is only capable of reconstructing x with an average RSNR ≈ 0.14 dB where Steve reaches an average RSNR ≈ 12.80 dB with η = 0.03. Note also that, although some lucky guesses exist with RSNR > 12.57 dB, it is impossible to identify them by looking at RSNR since the correlation coefficient between RSNR and RSNR is −0.0041. Therefore, Steve cannot rely on observing the RSNR to choose the best performing solutionÂ (1) , so both Eve and Steve's KPAs are inconclusive. As a further perceptual evidence of this, the best recoveries according to the RSNR are reported in Figure 7 .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analysed known-plaintext attacks as they may be carried out on standard CS schemes with antipodal random encoding matrices as well as on the particular multiclass protocol developed in [7] . In particular, the analysis was carried out from the two perspectives of an eavesdropper and a second-class user trying to guess the true encoding matrix. In both cases we have mapped multiclass CS into a collection of subset-sum problems with the aim of counting the candidate encoding matrices that match a given plaintext-ciphertext pair. In the eavesdropper case we have found that for each row the expected number grows as O(n − 1 2 · 2 n ) -finding the true solution among such huge sets is infeasible. A further study of the candidate solutions' Hamming distance from the true one showed that, as the dimensionality n increases, the expected number of solutions close to the true one is only a small fraction of the solution set. As for the second-class user we have shown that depending on the available information on the true encoding matrix, the expected number of solutions is significantly smaller, yet sufficiently high for large n to reassure that a second-class user will not be able to perform class-upgrade. Moreover, other class-upgrade attacks based on signal recovery under matrix uncertainty were shown to yield almost identical performances to those of a standard decoding algorithm.
Finally, we showed some simulated cases of KPAs on realworld signals such as ECG traces and images by running a random search for a solution set corresponding to realistic plaintext-ciphertext pairs, and afterwards tested whether any of the returned candidate solutions could lead to finding the true encoding matrix by testing them on a successive ciphertext. In all the observed cases, we have found that the decoding performances match the average RSNR level prescribed by the multiclass encryption protocol, i.e., both malicious users are unable to successfully decode other plaintexts with significant and stable quality improvements with respect to their available prior information.
APPENDIX A PROOFS ON EAVESDROPPER'S KPA
The following definition is used in Appendices A and C. Definition 3. We define the functions Figure 8) . We now compute the average of S Eve (τ, n, L) in τ , that clearly depends on the probability of selecting any value of υ ∈ {0, . . . ,
Since it is the result of a linear combination, the probability that a specific value of υ appears in a random instance of the SSP is proportional to the number of solutions associated to it. In normalised terms, the PDF of τ must be proportional to S Eve (τ, n, L), i.e., τ is distributed as
0, otherwise
With f τ (t) we can compute the expected number of solutions:
Although we could resort to numerical integration, (13) can be simplified by exploiting what noted above, i.e., that S Eve (τ, n, L) has an approximately Gaussian profile in τ ( Figure 8 ) with a maximum in τ = 1 /4. Hence, the expectation in τ becomes
that is actually independent of the σ 2 used in the Gaussian approximation, and in which we have exploited a( 1 /4) = 0 to obtain the statement of the theorem.
APPENDIX B HAMMING DISTANCE OF KPA SOLUTIONS
Proof of Theorem 2. We here concentrate on counting the number of candidate solutions {b l } n−1 l=0 to Eve's KPA that differ from the true one, {b l } n−1 l=0 , by exactly h components (at Hamming distance h). We assume that K ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1} is the set of indexes for which there is a disagreement, i.e., for all l ∈ K we have b l = 1−b l ; this set has cardinality h, and is one among are solutions to the same SSP, and that b l =b l are identical for l / ∈ K , l∈K 1 −b l u l = l∈Kb l u l must hold, implying the equality
Although (15) . Hence, we may count the configurations that verify (15) withb 0 = 0, knowing that their number will be only half of the total. With this, the configurations withb 0 = 0 must haveb l = 1 for at least one l > 0 in order to satisfy (15) , giving 2 h−1 − 1 total cases to check.
The following paragraphs illustrate that, for h < L, the number of configurations that verify (15) can be written as a polynomial of order h − 1. With this in mind we can start with the explicit computation for h = {2, 3}. For h = 2, there is only one feasible assignment for the {b l } n−1 l=0 , so u 0 = u 1 in (15), which makes 2L cases out of 2 2 L 2 . For h = 3, one has 3 feasible assignments for the {b l } n−1 l=0 . Due to the symmetry of (15) all the configurations have the same behaviour and we may focus on, e.g.,b 0 =b 1 = 0 andb 2 = 1 ⇒ u 0 + u 1 = u 2 ; this can be satisfied only when
configurations. This makes a total of 2 ·3 ·
For h > 3, this procedure is much less intuitive; nevertheless, we can at least prove that the function P h (L) counting the configurations for which (15) holds is a polynomial in L of degree h − 1. To show this, let us proceed in three steps.
1) Indicate with πb the (h − 1)-dimensional subspace of R h defined by (15) is an integer point in αb. To count those points define βb(L) = {0, . . . , L + 1} ∩ πb and note that the number of integer points in αb is equal to the number of integer points in the interior of βb (the points on the frontier of βb have at least one coordinate that is either 0 or L + 1). Note how {0, . . . , L+1} h scales linearly with L+1 while πb is a subspace and therefore scale-invariant. Hence, their intersection βb(L) is an h −1-dimensional polytope that scales proportionally to the integer L+1, as required by Ehrhart's theorem [41] . The number Eb(L) of integer points in βb(L) is then a polynomial in L + 1 (and so L) of degree equal to the dimensionality of βb(L), i.e., h − 1. From Ehrhart-Macdonald's reciprocity theorem [42] we know that the number of integer points in the interior of βb and thus in αb is (−1) h−1 Eb(−L), that is also a polynomial in L of degree h − 1. Assume F p (a, b) and G p (a, b) as in (11), (12) . Define the normalised constraint r = c j n and two quantities a(τ, r ) and b(τ, r ) that are the solutions of the following system of equalities r = F 0 (a, b) τ = F 1 (a, b) that are respectively equivalent to [18, (5.3-4) ]. We also define
With this, [18, (5.8-9) ] prove that the number of solutions of a γ -SSP with integer coefficients {u l } 
